Abstract: A key development during the Obama Administration was the increasing importance of state attorneys general (AGs) in national policymaking. This article examines the dual roles that AGs played during the Obama years. The first role was highly contentious, with Republican AGs leading several multistate challenges to Obama Administration priorities and successfully limiting Obama's policy legacy. The second role was more cooperative, involving increasing coordination between AGs and their federal counterparts in national enforcement efforts. Relying on case studies in the areas of immigration enforcement, climate change regulation, and the oversight of for-profit higher education, this article highlights several crucial trends concerning the activities of these important state-level actors.
with their state AGs (who are independently elected in most states) over the right to represent their states in litigation, and AGs were criticized both for their willingness to bring litigation and their refusal to defend their state in cases involving hot-button issues such as same-sex marriage, voter ID laws, and political redistricting (e.g., Jarvis and Blythe 2016) . Congress even became involved in state-level investigations for the first time, with members of Congress going as far as to issue subpoenas to AGs accused of harassing corporations (Schwartz 2016b) .
While this partisan conflict among AGs grew during the Obama Administration, AGs still engaged in a significant degree of cooperative, bipartisan behavior. AGs worked together on several investigations of corporate entities throughout this period, including on important antifraud initiatives, crime control, and drug policy. Additionally, from the first weeks of the Obama presidency, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) signaled that it would seek closer relationships with its state counterparts to tackle issues of common concern of the federal and state governments. This led to the creation of new collaborative efforts including the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, which (among many other efforts) concluded a major $26 billion settlement with the nation's five largest mortgage lenders over allegations stemming from the mortgage crisis.
This article examines both the conflictual and cooperative aspects of AG activities during Obama's presidency. It builds upon recent scholarly work exploring the institutional development of AGs and their increasing prominence in national policymaking. This increasing prominence in national politics began as early as the 1980s, when groups of AGs began working cooperatively to solve issues of concern to multiple states. Cornell Clayton noted how the "New Federalism" of the 1970s and 1980s reshaped the office by thrusting additional responsibilities on AGs. While AGs were once state-focused actors largely disconnected from one another, AGs created new mechanisms of interstate collaboration to help them handle their growing role in national policymaking (Clayton 1994, 542) . The crucial breakthrough came in the late 1990s, when forty-six AGs signed a $206 billion settlement with the tobacco industry that fundamentally altered tobacco policy and regulation in the United States (Derthick 2012) . By working together across state lines, AGs pooled their resources, provided legal heft to novel legal arguments, and found success in court against a major industry that private plaintiffs had unsuccessfully battled for decades.
AGs have since used this cooperative multi-state model to influence national policy in several other ways. Building upon their tobacco success, entrepreneurial AGs sought to reshape industry practices in the name of consumer protection (Provost 2003; 2006) . Particularly during the George W. Bush Administration, AGs also became more aggressive in employing multistate strategies against the federal government. Activist Democratic AGs such as New York's Eliot Spitzer led numerous campaigns to prevent attempts at regulatory rollback by federal agencies, particularly concerning environmental policy (Nolette 2015a) . AGs also became among the most active filers of amicus curiae briefs in federal courts -activity that has become increasingly partisan since the beginning of the 2000s (Lemos and Quinn 2015) . All of this building activity since the late 1990s set the stage for AGs to be critical players on the national stage during the Obama Administration.
This activity was made possible in part by Congress's decision to structure much of the contemporary regulatory state on the frame of cooperative federalism, thereby granting state and local governments key roles in the administration of federal policy. States are on the front lines of implementing much of the American environmental and health care policy regimes, for example, such as with enforcing clean air standards or administering Medicaid. This choice required federal and state actors to work together to solve common problems, but it also provided states additional leverage to pursue their own agendas within these policy regimes and to make demands on the federal government. Among other things, it led to the creation of new mechanisms of coordination and compromise among and between levels of government, such as the rise of negotiated waivers allowing for state-by-state variation in implementation of federal law (Thompson and Gusmano 2014; Wong 2015) .
The increasing institutional resources available to the AGs has also enabled their activism. In addition to creating new avenues of collaboration amongst themselves, AGs have been aided by other institutions and actors that have encouraged state litigation. The federal judiciary, for example, granted states "special solicitude" when determining whether states had standing to sue, making it easier for AGs to use the courts in challenges to national policy. This standing doctrine, a key part of the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) , offered a hook for AGs to bring challenges to new Obama-era laws and regulations.
At the same time, Congress continued to bolster AG power during the Obama years, providing AGs additional powers to enforce federal consumer protection laws. State legislatures also frequently allied with their state's AGs, providing additional resources and legal authority to bring lawsuits against corporations and the federal government alike. Meanwhile, ideological interest groups increasingly viewed AGs as powerful allies, providing strategic and financial support for multistate AG litigation (Nolette 2014 ).
This article examines how trends in AG activity that had been building since the late 1990s became an entrenched part of the national policy landscape during Obama's presidency.
During this time, AGs of both parties fully realized the benefits of collective action, taking advantage of collaborations amongst themselves -sometimes along partisan lines and other times on a bipartisan basis -to provide rapid responses to federal actions or corporate activities.
The scope of their collaborations has also encompassed policy areas in which states traditionally played a smaller role vis-à-vis the federal government, particularly immigration. This increased coordination has allowed AGs to act quickly as well as provide greater support for novel legal arguments.
Their efforts reflect their importance as both key veto points and opportunity points in contemporary American federalism (Wittes and Nivola 2015) . On the one hand, their activities have contributed to national policy "gridlock" by delaying or stopping implementation of federal laws and regulations. In the last years of the Obama Administration -and first few months of the Trump Administration -AGs took advantage of the increasing willingness of single federal district courts to issue national injunctions that blocked policies nationwide (Bray forthcoming While this illustrates the growth of increasing conflict in AG activism, the next section considers how important elements of AG activities remain cooperative and bipartisan. Especially important was the increased use of federal-state enforcement taskforces during the Obama Administration in which federal and state actors worked together to address common concerns.
Following an overview of this activity, I turn to a case study examining joint federal-state enforcement actions in the for-profit higher education industry. This highlights a more cooperative side of the relationship between AGs and their federal counterparts.
Analyzing these trends provides insight into how AGs' increasingly prominent role on the national stage both complicates and complements the operation of contemporary national policy. This role reflects deepening "trickle-down polarization" as partisanship on the national level has been increasingly reflected in the states, but also highlights that cooperative efforts aiming to solve shared problems remains possible even in this increasingly polarized era.
POLARIZATION AND CONFLICT IN AG ACTIVITY
As noted above, polarization among AGs has been building since AGs became more involved in national politics and policy. Shortly after the tobacco litigation, for example, AGs 1 While this provision was dropped from the final legislation, this initial collaboration eventually blossomed into a multistate effort raising several constitutional challenges to the ACA. 2 Among other arguments, the states' lawsuit claimed that the Medicaid expansion provision of the ACA violated federalism principles by essentially forcing the states to go along with a federal program. These arguments ultimately succeeded in limiting the ACA's Medicaid expansion by allowing states to opt out of the expansion, which subsequently set up contentious state-level fights over heath care provision.
The ACA litigation also presaged later AG challenges to other Obama-era policies. To give a sense of the expansiveness of these multistate AG challenges, Table 1 highlights several of the most prominent AG-led lawsuits against Obama Administration policies.
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Recent Trends Towards Greater Conflict in AG Activities
The emergence of a distinctly Republican AG activism is perhaps the most prominent trend in AG activity that emerged during the Obama Administration. This trend contrasts with the comparatively subdued Republican AG activity during the previous Democratic presidential administration. Republican AGs attempted few multistate challenges to President Bill Clinton's regulatory and legislative program, and even most of these were bipartisan efforts. 3 Republican
AGs formed the Republican Attorneys General Association in 1999 largely in response to the alleged "regulation through litigation" engaged in by liberal AGs; but this organization focused initially on fundraising goals rather than litigation strategy (Curriden 1999 immigrants to obtain work permits would also raise additional permit processing costs for the states, and the grant of deferred action would increase costs relating to issuance of drivers'
licenses to the beneficiaries of the program. 6 The plaintiff AGs made two main sets of legal arguments, one constitutional and one statutory. First, the plaintiffs claimed that the actions violated the Take Care Clause in Article II of the Constitution because they amounted to changing the law as opposed to simply using discretion to shape its enforcement. In particular, the AGs pointed to several immigration laws that they argued placed a mandatory duty on the executive branch to deport individuals not in the country legally. Furthermore, Congress had already specified a procedure for undocumented parents of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents to stay in the United States. Contravening these congressional procedures, the states argued, was not within the president's power to "faithfully execute the law." 7 In addition to this constitutional argument, the AGs argued that the administration had violated the procedures for creating new rules required by Administrative Procedure Act (APA). For most rules, the APA requires that the agency provide notice of its proposed rules and an opportunity for affected parties to comment on them. Because neither DACA nor DAPA went through this notice-and-comment rulemaking, the states argued, the agency had illegally sidestepped statutory requirements. The AGs made a substantive APA argument as well, arguing that even if the Administration had followed the APA's procedures, the orders would still be invalid because the DHS' actions essentially rewrote the law as opposed to enforcing it. 8 Of the twenty AGs involved in the challenge, all but one were Republican. 9 The additional state plaintiffs included the governors of several states whose AG declined to join the lawsuit. Throughout much of the litigation, this Republican coalition faced off against a sixteenmember all-Democratic AG coalition that defended the Obama Administration's actions through amicus curiae filings. Democratic AGs argued that far from hurting states, DACA and DAPA would actually benefit states by increasing state income tax revenues, improving public safety, and providing a more secure living situation for resident children of undocumented immigrants. 10 Additionally, they argued that several of the alleged harms suffered by states -such as additional costs accrued because of the issuance of driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants -were self-inflicted since neither federal initiative required states to issues such licenses to undocumented individuals.
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). In short, even if DHS had properly followed the APA's procedural rules -which the Fifth Circuit held it did not -the orders would still be invalid because the INA did not provide DHS the broad authority it claimed when issuing the orders. Under many key environmental statutes, including the Clean Air Act (CAA), states serve a primary role in implementing minimum pollution standards set by the federal government. This approach aims to both harness regulatory power on both levels of government and to reduce a potentially destructive "race to the bottom" in state environmental standard-setting (Engel 2015) .
While this cooperative model has prompted federal and state officials to work together to solve common concerns, it also opened the door for states to have greater say concerning the shape and extent of national regulatory policy. The structure of this "cooperative" regulatory regime provides opportunities for state officials to both work with and push back against federal approaches in this area. October 2015, a coalition of twenty-four AGs and state agencies filed a motion to stay the rules (West Virginia, et al. v. EPA, No. 15-1363 [D.C. Cir., filed October 23, 2015 ). Other AGs filed separate but closely linked challenges, as did a large number of business associations, labor groups, and utilities. The basic argument was that the states and other groups would suffer "immediate and irreparable harm" due to the tight timeline demanded by the EPA for states to implement the new rules. The plaintiffs argued that they were likely to prevail on the merits for the same statutory and constitutional reasons as the parties had raised in the earlier litigation prior to the EPA's finalized rule.
The litigation generated numerous filings from states either challenging or supporting the EPA, as indicated in Table 3 . A counter-coalition of nineteen Democratic AGs, led by New York AG Eric Schneiderman, intervened to support the EPA's position. Several environmental and industry groups also joined the EPA's position. Members of Congress became involved in the litigation as well, filing amicus briefs on highly polarized lines either supporting or opposing the challenge.
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In a brief order in January 2016, the D.C. Circuit denied the request to stay the CPP. Similarly, the AGs part of the group intended to uncover similar "smoking guns" that could be used to eventually force ExxonMobil and other energy companies to enter regulatory settlements. "It's too early to say what we're going to find," Schneiderman said during the announcement of the coalition, but "we intend to work as aggressively as possible" (Schwartz 2016a ). The effort would include bringing to bear several laws granting AGs wide investigatory powers, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and several state consumer protection and deceptive business and trade practices acts. These same statutes had played a major role in the tobacco litigation as well. The AGs argued that this effort was necessary in light of the federal government's failure to do more to address climate change. As
Rhode Island AG Peter Kilmartin put it, "if Washington is not going to step up and recognize the crisis and find meaningful solutions, then it will be up to the states to do so" (New York
Attorney General 2016).
While most of the AGs attending the meeting did not reveal whether they had started any investigations, three AGs did specify that they had opened their own investigations -California AG Kamala Harris, Massachusetts AG Maura Healey, and U.S. Virgin Islands AG Claude
Walker. Walker's investigation was particularly wide-ranging, as he issued subpoenas not only to ExxonMobil but also to conservative organizations looking for evidence that the company teamed up with ideological groups to oppose climate change (Schwartz 2016c (Schwartz 2016d ).
The AGs refused to comply with the congressional subpoenas, calling the request "a dangerous overreach by the Committee and an affront to states' rights" (Hasemyer 2016 ).
Nevertheless, the legal pushback from ExxonMobil and its AG amici led to both Walker and Healey withdrawing their subpoenas. As of this writing, the AGs' investigations remain active, though it remains unclear to what extent courts will allow the investigations to proceed.
Lessons of the Climate Change Battles
Regardless of the ultimate result of the CPP challenges and the AG investigations of ExxonMobil, they both highlight several key aspects of AG activism during the latter years of the Obama Administration. For one, AGs remain as committed as ever to the creative use of their expansive powers -which operate largely independently from other state officials -to achieve national public policy goals. This now firmly entrenched nationalized activism has meant that AG strategizing about potential legal challenges is ongoing and anticipatory, rather than ad hoc and reactive. Republican AGs were already in conversations about how to challenge the CPP before even the proposed rules were announced, allowing near-immediate challenges to administration policies. The plaintiff AG coalition employed something of a "kitchen sink" approach of using various substantive and procedural arguments to delay the rules, including taking the unusual step of challenging the EPA's new rules at every stage before they even became final. Likewise, the AGs United for Clean Power initiative has relied upon new arguments based on expansive definitions of "fraud" in state investigations to advance broader nationally-focused goals on climate change.
Unlike many previous federalism disputes in American history that have primarily involved regional divisions, it is partisan divisions that have been most prominent in these 
Recent Trends Towards Greater Cooperation in AG Activities
The enrollment in these institutions reached its peak (Lederman 2010) . The University of Phoenix, claiming some 300,000 students nationwide, became the largest private university in America.
Despite this rapid growth, however, the high percentage of student defaults and low graduation rates led to increased federal scrutiny of the industry as early as the 1980s. But it was a pair of key federal government reports that provided additional attention to the industry and escalated the industry's legal problems. A 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggested that students at for-profit schools had particularly low graduation rates yet were left with very high debt levels (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2009). Another GAO report the following year found evidence of deceptive tactics and fraud at several for-profit colleges. The report, which followed an undercover sting involving investigators posing as students interested in enrolling in for-profit colleges, detailed how several colleges encouraged students to provide false information on student loan applications. The report also found that school officials at fifteen for-profit institutions had also provided misleading information about the programs' costs and the employment prospects for students graduating from the programs (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2010).
Significant subsequent revisions to the GAO report softened several of its harshest evaluations of the industry, leading to criticism of the GAO by Republican members of Congress and to a lawsuit by a for-profit education industry group (Weinberger 2011) . Nevertheless, the report sparked additional oversight of the industry from several quarters. The GAO's report was Since its creation, the interagency taskforce has taken various actions against several forprofit schools and in a relatively short time placed the entire industry on life support. Some of the actions occurred independently but parallel to one another, with federal agencies and AGs sharing information leading to subpoenas and subsequent lawsuits against the same institutions.
Other actions have resulted in single, coordinated federal-state settlements conducted in a similar fashion to the settlements achieved by the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.
For example, a November 2015 settlement with Education Management Corporation (EDMC) involving the federal government and thirty-nine AGs resolved a variety of claims against the company. These claims included state consumer protection claims as well as under the federal False Claims Act, which allows the government to recover funds from private entities who used fraud to obtain public money. The settlement included a $95 million fine paid to the government and $102 million worth of debt relief to affected students, but the settlement's most important contributions were in its conduct terms. The terms, which read like agency regulations, required the company to provide students additional disclosures, orientation programs, and opportunities to withdraw from programs free of charge. It also created a new industry monitor that would oversee the company's compliance with the settlement terms (U.S. Department of Justice 2015). While only applicable to EDMC, the taskforce members stated that they hoped these terms would serve as a code of conduct for other members of the industry -including the many that remained potential targets of the AGs and the broader taskforce.
Interagency Enforcement and the Cooperative Extension of the Regulatory State
The progression of coordinated legal attacks on the for-profit higher education industry illustrates a different and more cooperative version of AG activism during the Obama Administration. In this case, investigations by the federal GAO and Congress provided momentum for AGs to pursue state-level probes themselves, which in turn helped feed further investigations by federal enforcement agencies. Eventually, the relationships between the federal government (the DOJ, CFPB, and other agencies) and the AGs strengthened as their investigations and settlements became explicitly cooperative.
As with other interagency task forces, particularly the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task
Force, the resolution of investigations sought to achieve policy and regulatory changes in an industry in the face of perceived congressional inaction. Advocates for industry reform pressed
Congress to curb alleged abuses, particularly after the initial GAO report, but little legislative action was forthcoming. The response was to employ enforcement actions to achieve quasiregulatory settlements that sought to establish the new codes of conduct Congress would not.
This cooperative activity has tended to attract more bipartisan support. Most of the nation's AGs, both Democrats and Republicans, were involved in the federal/state investigations into the for-profit education sector. That said, these efforts have received some criticism for potentially exceeding executive power at the expense of Congress. As the interagency taskforce on for-profit education became more active, for example, several Republican U.S. Senators sent a letter to the DOE Secretary skeptically probing the purposes of and statutory authority for the task force. 21 The taskforce's formation, after all, occurred amidst failures to enact the Proprietary Education Oversight Coordination Improvement Act (also supported by many AGs), which would have explicitly allowed interagency oversight of the for-profit education industry. As "informal" coordination, by contrast, the taskforce did not have similar legislative authority.
Nevertheless, the initiative continued to generate bipartisan enforcement actions throughout the remainder of the Obama presidency.
As with many other policy areas, it remains to be seen how the Trump Administration will handle allegations of fraud by for-profit educational institutions. Many observers believed a significant policy shift would occur, particularly given that Trump's own for-profit university Regardless of how the balance of contention and cooperation among AGs and the federal government shapes up in the coming years, it is safe to say that AGs will not easily concede the considerable influence on the national stage that they have built up over the past two presidential administrations. President Trump, like Obama and Bush before him, will need to contend with the growing national activism of these important state-level officials.
